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Abstract
Targeted advertising is an emerging business area that provides
effective services for advertisers and end users. Advertising agencies
need information about users to send them targeted advertisements.
However, uncontrolled access to users’ sensitive information for adver-
tising purposes violates the privacy of individuals. Therefore, efficient
techniques must be used to not only preserve users privacy but also
enable advertisers to reach right users.
In this thesis, we present a privacy-preserving scheme for targeted
advertising via the Internet Protocol TV (IPTV). The scheme uses a
communication model involving a collection of viewers/subscribers, a
content provider (IPTV), an advertiser, and a cloud server. To provide
high quality directed advertising service, the advertiser can utilize not
only demographic information of subscribers, but also their watching
habits. The latter includes watching history, preferences for IPTV
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content and watching time, which are published on the cloud server
periodically along with anonymized demographics (e.g. weekly). Since
the published data may leak sensitive information about subscribers,
it is safeguarded using cryptographic techniques in addition to the
anonymization of demographics. The techniques used by the adver-
tiser, which can be manifested in its queries to the cloud, are consid-
ered (trade) secrets and therefore are protected as well. The cloud is
oblivious to the published data, the queries of the advertiser as well
as its own responses to these queries. Only a legitimate advertiser,
endorsed with a so-called trapdoor by the IPTV, can query the cloud
and utilize the query results. The performance of the proposed scheme
is evaluated with experiments, which show that the scheme is suitable
for practical usage.
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Özet
Hedeflemeli reklamcılık, reklamcı ve son kulanıcılar için etkin hizmetler
sunan gelişmekte olan bir iş alanıdır. Reklam ajanslarının hedeflemeli reklam
gönderebilmek için kullanıcılar ile ilgili yeterli bilgiye sahip olmaları gerekir.
Ancak kullanıcıların hassas bilgilerine ulaşmak onların mahremiyetlerini tehlik-
eye atabilir. Bunun için hem kullanıcıların mahremiyetini koruyan hem de
reklam ajansının doğru hedef kullanıcılara ulaşmasını sağlayan bir yöntem
kullanılmalıdır.
Bu tezde Internet Protokolu üzerinden televizyon servisi (IPTV) için
mahremiyeti koruyan bir hedeflemeli reklamcılık yöntemi önerilmiştir. Bu
yöntemdeki iletişim modeli belirli sayıda izleyici/abone, bir içerik sağlayıcı
(IPTV), bir reklam ajansı ve bir bulut sunucusundan oluşur. Kullanıcılara
yüksek kaliteli hedeflemeli reklamcılık servisi sunabilmek için, reklam ajansı
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hem kullanıcıların demografik bilgilerinden hem de izleme alışkanlıkların-
dan yararlanabilir. İzleme alışkanlığı, kullanıcının tercih ettiği program-
ları ve seyretme zamanlarını içerir ve bu bilgi bulut sunucu üzerinden belli
periyotlarla, demografik verinin anonimliği korunarak yayınlanır. Yayın-
lanan veri, abonelerin hasas bilgilerini açık edebileceği için verinin anonim-
leştirilmesinin yanı sıra şifreleme teknikleri de kullanılarak verinin güvenliği
sağlanır. Reklam ajansının sorguları onun ticari sırları ile ilgili bilgi içere-
bileceği için korunması gerekir. Bulut sunucusu, yayınlanmış veriler, reklam
ajansının sorguları ve bu sorgulara verdiği yanıtlar hakkında bilgi sahibi
değildir. Sadece meşru bir reklam ajansı, IPTV’nin verdiği gizli kapıyı (trap-
door) kullanarak bulut üzerinde sorgu yapabilir ve yanıtlarından yararlan-
abilir. Yapılan deneylerin sonuçları önerilen metodun performansının pratik
kullanım için uygun olduğunu göstermektedir.
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1 Introduction
Literature suggests [15] that content targeting (e.g. advertisement to cus-
tomers) is potentially a huge and lucrative business. Traditional media such
as TV, radio, or newspaper can do only a little to customize advertisements
of products or services for their customers. It is suggested [18] that sponsors
are more interested in sending advertisements of their products to prospec-
tive customers with high accuracy. Online media offers better opportunities
for targeting prospective customers by utilizing customers online history, ob-
served behavior, and demographics. Therefore targeted advertising, where
advertisements are selected on the basis of online traits and demographics of
individuals, is preferred by many advertising agencies to increase the total
benefit gained from advertisement. However, a major issue is the potential
violation of the privacy of individuals.
It appears as if IPTV (Internet Protocol TV) is becoming a preferred
online media with potentially millions of subscribers. IPTV service providers
(henceforth only IPTV) are technically able to store watching history of
subscribers and their preferences for IPTV content; they can also obtain
personal information by handing out questionnaires when signing a contract
with subscribers [12]. Thus IPTV is a hot spot for advertising agencies that
have the incentives to utilize the information that IPTV collects about its
subscribers. The collected information generates subscriber profiles which
are undoubtedly sensitive. Although IPTV is willing to protect subscriber
profiles from unauthorized access, he has an economic interest to sell the
data to third parties.
As in many other areas the data collected by IPTV is accumulating over
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time and therefore there is a motivation to outsource data warehousing to
a cloud service. Such outsourcing can decrease cost by mitigating the bur-
dens of storage, service management and expenditure on hardware or soft-
ware [7]. The media attention given to cloud computing suggests that it
is gaining a considerable attention in business environments allowing their
customers to store and access data remotely. Sensitive data such as personal
health records, private videos and photos, email etc. can also be stored on
cloud servers. It is suggested to encrypt data before outsourcing to protect
the privacy of data and prevent unauthorized access to data in the cloud
[13]. However, by encrypting data, one of the key functionality of database
systems, i.e. keyword-based search operation, becomes a challenging issue.
Many searchable encryption schemes such as [9], [22] lack query flexibility
and/or use complicated cryptographic algorithms which require high com-
putational power. The high computational cost may render outsourcing the
data collected by IPTV as ineffective solution.
In our setting the advertiser needs to perform multi-predicate queries
on a remote database (e.g. implemented in a cloud server) to find records
matching with the predicates in his query. Hiding keywords in a query by
the advertiser is essential to prevent the disclosure of its trade secrets to
the cloud server, to other advertisers and perhaps to IPTV itself. Thus the
advertiser needs to query an encrypted database using encrypted keywords.
The core challenge we address in this thesis is to facilitate this efficiently.
Our aim is to devise a practical privacy-preserving scheme, whereby
each authorized advertiser can perform multi-predicate queries on a remote
database (e.g. stored in the cloud server), and sends personalized adver-
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tisements to subscribers matching with the predicates in the query. The
proposed scheme is different from the previous works on the same subject,
in which IPTV operator (i.e. the owner of the database) is also in charge of
processing the data and selecting the best advertisements for the subscribers.
Naturally, in that setting the privacy of the subscribers is not a major con-
cern. However, in our case the data is outsourced to the cloud which is honest
but curious (i.e. the server does not modify the message but is curious to an-
alyze the message content to infer additional information); consequently the
privacy of users must be protected. The additional benefits of the proposed
scheme are: i) partially relieve IPTV of management cost and processing of
data, ii) data mining required for targeted advertising can be performed by
advertising agencies, iii) IPTV can generate revenue from subscribers data
by providing sufficient data-protection safeguards in comply with relevant
legislations 1, and iv) advertiser’s mining techniques are not exposed to the
cloud server and IPTV. The scheme is also useful when the advertiser is a
division within IPTV. In this case, IPTV has robust data protection prac-
tices perhaps in accordance with the relevant legislations. That is IPTV
keeps sensitive data in encrypted form; data used for targeted advertisement
includes only necessary, anonymized information about the subscribers; and
access control to data can be exercised in a fine-grained manner.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 contains back-
ground information on structure of IPTV, anonymization and clustering
methods, and cryptographic algorithms followed by the related work. In
Section 3, motivation and contributions of the thesis are presented. Then we
1Current legislations usually stipulate users consent and proper data protection tech-
niques such as encryption and anonymization before disclosure and/or processing.
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describe our proposed solutions in detail in Section 4. In Section 5, we argue
the extend the privacy requirements are met and in Section 6 the evaluation
of our proposed solution is presented. Finally, we conclude the thesis and
provide a roadmap for future work in Section 7.
2 Background Information and Related Work
In this section, we explain IPTV system. Then, we give an introductory
information about privacy-preserving data publishing techniques. Following
that, we explain the clustering techniques and the cryptographic algorithms
we utilize. Finally, we conclude the section with the related works in the
field of targeted advertising and searchable encryption on the cloud.
2.1 Internet Protocol Television (IPTV)
IPTV is a system, through which a television services are delivered using the
Internet Protocol (IP) over broadband instead of through satellite signal or
cable television formats [4]. The IPTV service is offered by most telecom
operators.
IPTV operator usually provides the following services:
• live television - TV contents simultaneously with the broadcast TV;
• time-shifted television - replays of TV shows that were broadcast ear-
lier;
• video on demand (VOD) - selection from a list of videos not related to
TV content.
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In traditional television, all programs are broadcast at the same time and
the viewer selects the program by changing the channels. In contrast, with
IPTV all the streams remain on the service provider’s network and only one
program is sent at a time due to the bandwidth limitation. Thus transmis-
sion of the stream depends on the viewers’ program selections. Whenever a
channel is changed, a new stream is transmitted to the viewer. Consequently
the service provider knows exactly the viewing habits of each viewer, i.e.
every program watched, duration of watching, etc. Such information can be
used for better provisioning and targeted advertising.
Since IPTV operators are technically able to record users’ viewing habits,
they can sell that information to third parties such as advertisers [4]. Under
normal circumstances an IPTV service provider is assumed to be an honest
party and does not divulge any information about an individual user to a
third party. However, to generate revenues from the collected data, IPTV
can sign an agreement with advertising agencies to send their targeted adver-
tisements to viewers. To diminish the cost and burden of data management
and processing, IPTV can outsource viewers’ data in encrypted format to a
cloud server and enable advertising agencies to query, search, and mine the
viewers’ data.
2.1.1 Architecture of IPTV
The architecture of IPTV is shown in Figure 1. This figure can be divided
into following components [1]:
• Dish, which is placed at the IPTV service provider’s head-end and
receives the video contents from the broadcasters.
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Figure 1: Architecture of IPTV
• Video encoder, encodes the video contents received by dish into IP
stream.
• DSLAM (Digital Subscriber Line Access Multiplexer), distributes IPTV
streams to customer premises.
• ADSL modem, Set-top box and TV are located at the customer premises.
IPTV streams are received by modem and then sent to Set-top box. IP
streams are reassembled into a coherent video stream by Set-top box
and then are transformed to the format that can be displayed by TV.
2.2 Targeted Advertising
Targeted advertising is a mechanism through which advertisements are sent
to the right consumers based on some filtering methods utilizing consumer in-
formation such as demographics, viewed items history, geographical location,
user behavior, etc. [16]. This mechanism is beneficial for advertising agen-
cies since it maximizes the probability of an advertisement being taken into
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consideration or clicked by consumers. Techniques for targeted advertising
can be divided into two categories:
1. Behavioral targeting: behavioral targeting considers users profile by
analyzing watched or bought items in the past and finds other products
with similar characteristic. Several online stores such as Amazon [17]
use this technique to recommend their products.
2. Contextual targeting: contextual targeting uses the content that is
currently watched by a user and suggests similar products. Google’s
Adsense [2] service uses this technique by exploring the content of web
page and estimates the advertisements which are more relevant to the
content. For example, if a website visited by a user is related to pop
music, it can suggest the advertisements for pop concerts close to the
user’s location.
In this thesis we provide an efficient scheme for behavioral targeting.
2.3 Privacy-preserving Data Publishing Techniques
In our proposed scheme, subscriber profiles which are considered sensitive in-
formation are published on a cloud server. The IPTV has to employ privacy-
preserving techniques to anonymize data before outsourcing it to the cloud
server. In the following section we explain some of these techniques.
2.3.1 Anonymization
Privacy concerns arise wherever the collected information can identify a per-
son. Information such as healthcare records, financial transactions, home ad-
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dress and geographical records can be used to identify an individual, which,
in turn, compromise the privacy of people. The challenge in data privacy
is to share or publish data while protecting identifiable information. Shared
data is beneficial for different groups of people such as researchers or ad-
vertising agencies. There are different techniques such as randomization,
generalization, k-anonymity and l-diversity for anonymizing sensitive data.
2.3.2 k-anonymity
k-anonymity guarantees that every record in a dataset is indistinguishable
from at least k−1 other records with respect to certain identifying attributes.
If a record satisfies this condition, it can be published on public server [21].
Data holders mostly remove users’ identifier such as social security number
when releasing data on public servers to hide users’ identity. However, in
most cases removing the identity (an other identifier information) will not
guarantee the anonymity of users. Released information might still include
quasi-identifiers data such as ZIP code, medical records, birth date, etc.
which can be linked with other public data to acquire sensitive information
about users.
2.3.3 l-diversity
There are two kinds of attributes in a dataset: quasi identifiers, and sensitive
attributes. The former one is the set of attributes which can identify a unique
user when they are linked with external data. In k-anonymity records are
anonymized with respect to their quasi identifiers, however, the sensitive data
may remain on the server. An attacker who has some background knowledge
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about a user can easily estimate the value of a sensitive attribute for the
corresponding user from the published data. Hence, it will be more difficult
for the attacker to estimate the sensitive attributes if there are l sensitive
values for k-blocks of data [14].
2.3.4 Generalization
In this technique general values are used instead of the exact values of an
attribute to protect data. In our dataset we take advantage of this method
to generalize some attributes. For example the age of subscribers are repre-
sented by categorical values such as: 15-20, 20-30, 30-40, etc. In addition,
instead of exact location of each subscriber in the dataset, we divide loca-
tions into three different categories: low-income areas, middle-income areas,
and high-income areas. In our dataset we remove the social identifier (social
security number, citizenship number etc.) and name of subscribers when
publishing data.
To protect the privacy of subscribers we assume that IPTV applies anonymiza-
tion techniques before outsourcing data to a cloud server. Clustering can be
an alternative to prevent from publishing all subscribers’ data on the cloud.
However, there are some weaknesses with this method as we explain in Sec-
tion 3.1. Next we give detailed information about clustering.
2.4 Clustering
Clustering is a process of partitioning the data (or objects) into a set of
classes called cluster so that objects in a cluster are similar to one another
but are dissimilar to objects in other clusters [5, Chapter 7]. A cluster of data
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objects can be treated collectively as a single object and therefore clustering
is considered as a form of data compression. Thus, clustering techniques
can be used for data anonymization purposes. In Section 3.1 we employ
a clustering method over data and publish the representative point of each
cluster on a cloud server. In that section, we will explain in more details
whether this method is beneficial to provide anonymization or not.
2.4.1 Data Types
There are different types of data represented in cluster analysis, and each is
preprocessed differently. Suppose that our dataset (for IPTV) to be clustered
contains n subscribers, each represented by p variables such as age, marital
status, education, occupation, and so on. Therefore the dataset can be rep-
resented by a matrix where each row contains data of a subscriber and each
column is an attribute. 
x11 ... x1f ... x1p
... ... ... ... ...
xi1 ... xif ... xip
... ... ... ... ...
xn1 ... xnf ... xnp

Dissimilarities are calculated based on the attribute values describing each
object. Having n objects, dissimilarity can be represented by following n-by-
n matrix where d(i, j) is the dissimilarity between objects i and j.
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
0 d(1, 2) d(1, 3) ... d(1, n)
d(2, 1) 0 d(2, 3) ... ...
d(3, 1) d(3, 2) 0 ... ...
... ... ... 0 ...
d(n, 1) ... ... ... 0

The main diagonal entries are zero d(i, i) = 0, and entries outside the di-
agonal are symmetric with respect to main diagonal that is d(i, j) = d(j, i).
Typically clustering algorithms operate on dissimilarity matrix. Measures
of dissimilarity are computed differently for objects represented by different
variable types.
In many real databases, objects are represented by different type of vari-
ables. We explain three types of variables in our dataset.
“Binary” variables: having only two states 0 or 1. For instance gender is
a binary variable where 1 may indicate that subscriber is female, while 0
indicates otherwise.
“Categorical” variables: are generalization of the binary variables with more
than two states. States can be represented by letters or numbers.
“Ordinal” variables: resemble a categorical variable, except that the states
of the ordinal value are ordered in a meaningful sequence.
To compute the dissimilarity between objects of mixed variable types, it
is better to process all variable types together, performing a single cluster
analysis. One such technique combines the different variables into a single
dissimilarity matrix, bringing all of the meaningful variables onto a common
scale of interval [0.0,1.0].
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Suppose that the database contains p variables of mixed types. The
dissimilarity between objects i and j is calculated as:
d(i, j) =
∑p
f=1 δ
(f)
ij d
(f)
ij∑p
f=1 δ
(f)
ij
where δ(f)ij =0 if there is no measurement of variable f for object i (xif ) or
object j (xjf ); otherwise δ
(f)
ij =1.
d
(f)
ij is computed depending on its type:
• If f is binary or categorical: d(f)ij =0 if xif=xjf ; otherwise d(f)ij =1.
• If f is ordinal: f has Mf ordered states, representing the ranking 1,...,
Mf . Each xif is replaced by its corresponding rank rif and zif =
rif−1
M−1f
is computed. Then, the distance between i and j is calculated as:
d
(f)
ij =
|zif−zjf |
max
h
xhf −minhxhf
where h runs over all non-missing objects for variable f .
2.4.2 Clustering Methods
There are several clustering algorithms in the literature. A suitable one for
our dataset is partitioning method. Given a dataset of n objects and k as
the number of partitions, a partitioning method distributes n objects into k
clusters such that the objects within a cluster are similar, while the objects of
different clusters are dissimilar in terms of the dataset attributes. There are
well-known methods in partitioning such as k-means, k-medoids, and their
variations [5, Chapter 7]. We focus on k-medoids method since k-means
method is not suitable for categorical attributes in a dataset.
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In contrast to k-means method, where the mean value of the objects in
a cluster is taken as a reference point, actual objects represent clusters in
k-medoids. Thus, one representative object is chosen arbitrarily per cluster.
Each remaining object is assigned to the cluster of the closest representative
object. The iterative process of replacing representative objects by non-
representative objects of the cluster continues as long as the quality of the
clusters is improved, that is the sum of the dissimilarities between each object
in a cluster and cluster representative point is minimized. The sum of dis-
similarities which is called absolute-error is represented by E and calculated
as
E =
∑k
j=1
∑
pCj
| p− oj |
where p is an object in cluster Cj and oj is the representative object of Cj.
In Algorithm 1 different steps of generating k clusters using k-medoids
partitioning method are shown.
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Algorithm 1 K-medoids partitioning algorithm
Input:
• k: the number of clusters,
• D: a dataset containing n objects.
Output: k clusters.
1. choose k objects arbitrarily from dataset D as the initial representative
objects (a.k.a. medoids, o1, . . . , ok);
2. for each remaining object compute a distance to all representative ob-
jects and assign the object to the cluster with the nearest representative
object;
3. for each representative object oj, i.e. for i from 1 to k,
(a) For each non-medoid data point or;
i. compute the absolute-error, E, for the configuration where
the object oj is swapped with or
4. Select the configuration with the lowest cost;
5. repeat the steps 2 and 5 until there is no change in the medoids;
The k-medoids method is more robust than k-means in the presence of
noise and outliers since a medoid is less influenced by outliers or other extreme
values than a mean. However, its processing is more costly than the k-means
method. Both methods require the user to specify k, the number of clusters.
2.5 HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code)
HMAC is a mechanism to verify the message integrity and authenticity using
cryptographic hash function in combination with secret keys [3]. Any cryp-
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tographic hash function, such as MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2 can be used in the
calculation of HMAC. The cryptographic strength of the HMAC depends on
the characteristic of the underlying hash function, the length of a hash value,
and the size and quality of secret key.
2.5.1 HMAC definition
The HMAC is defined as :
HMAC(k,m) = H((k ⊕ opad)‖H((k ⊕ ipad)‖m)),
where:
• m is a message.
• k is a secret key.
• H is a cryptographic hash function.
• ⊕ denotes XOR (exclusive or).
• ‖ denotes concatenation.
• opad is the outer padding (0x5c5c5c. . . 5c5c, one-block-long hexadeci-
mal constant).
• ipad is the inner padding (0x363636. . . 3636, one-block-long hexadeci-
mal constant).
We use HMAC in our proposed method.
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2.6 Recommender systems
Recommender systems can assist customers to find products that match with
their needs and preferences [6]. They can recommend any content (movie,
book, TV program, video on demand, music, advertisement, etc.) or services
that are likely to be of interest to the customers. A recommender system
estimates a user rating or preference degree for contents not being purchased
or used by the user in the past. Estimation is done by comparing a user
profile with some characteristics depending on the filtering method used by
the recommender. A variety of techniques have been proposed for performing
recommendation, including content-based, collaborative, knowledge-based,
etc. Sometimes these methods are combined in hybrid recommenders to
improve performance.
The best known techniques for recommendation are as follows:
• Collaborative Filtering: In this method, the profile of users and
their rates to different products are considered to generate different
groups of users. Recommendation is offered based on inner-user com-
parison. That is, the system recommends a product to a user depending
on the behavior of other group members.
• Content-based Filtering: In this method, products are compared
based on their content. Each product content is defined by some fea-
tures. Recommender system finds user interest by observing the fea-
tures of products the user has rated before. It recommends products
with features that are very similar to the features of the products rated
by the user.
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• Hybrid Filtering: In hybrid recommender systems, two or more
techniques are combined to attain better performance. Collaborative
and content-based characteristics may be unified in one single model
(e.g., simultaneously using user and item attributes to compute rat-
ings).
2.7 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography is a cryptographic system where the keys used to
encrypt and decrypt a message are different. Each user has a pair of two keys
referred as public key and private key, respectively. The public key is publicly
accessible to other entities, while the private key is known only to his owner.
Although these keys are mathematically related, it is computationally infea-
sible to deduce the value of a private key from the corresponding public key.
The public key cryptography provides two important cryptographic primi-
tives, namely public key encryption (PKE) and digital signature algortihm
(DSA). There are different techniques in public key cryptography such as
Diffie–Hellman key exchange, RSA, ElGamal, etc. We use RSA since it is
the most popular public key cryptography system.
2.7.1 RSA Public Key Cryptography
RSA algorithm is named after its inventors, Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and
Len Adleman in 1978. It is an algorithm that is based on the difficulty of
factoring large integers.
User of a RSA system performs the following stages to generate his public
and private key.
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1. Chooses two large primes p, q.
2. Computes n = pq.
3. Computes φ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1).
4. Chooses a random integer, 1 < e < φ(n) such that gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1.
5. Computes d = e−1 (mod ) φ(n) that is ed = 1 (mod ) φ(n).
6. Public key: (e, n) and private key: (d, p, q).
In public key encryption, a message is encrypted with the public key of a
recipient, and no one except the recipient can decrypt the message. Public
key encryption is used for confidentiality to prevent the disclosure of infor-
mation to unauthorized parties. The encryption and decryption operations
are illustrated below:
RSA encryption: y = me (mod ) n where m < n
RSA decryption: m = yd (mod ) n
In digital signatures, a message signed with the private key of a sender, and
anyone, who has access to the public key of the sender, can verify a signature
as follows:
RSA signature: s = md (mod ) n
RSA verification: m = se (mod ) n
2.8 Related Work
Most of the previous works which provide targeted content to subscribers
of IPTV rely on recommender system techniques. In those works, the most
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appropriate content is selected for a certain customer using so-called filtering
techniques. In [19], the proposed system uses subscribers watching history
and program preferences to provide a high-quality program recommendation.
The privacy of subscribers is not a major concern in this context since IPTV
that already has subscribers’ data is in charge of recommending content to
users. Kodialam et al. [15] propose a method for on-line scheduling of tar-
geted advertisement for IPTV which chooses a set of advertisements in each
time slot and assigns users to one of these selected advertisements. Adver-
tiser’s bid for TV advertisement is kept at IPTV side. Assigning advertise-
ment to subscribers is done by considering those bids and users demographic
or behavioral information. Konow et al. [16] proposed a recommender system
using collaborative filtering for selecting the most appropriate advertisement
for a certain customer based on the success that the advertisement has had
in the past among other customers having similar preferences. Advertiser
provides meta-data about the profile of people the advertisement is aimed
at. In this system IPTV processes customers profile data and selects the best
advertisement matches with their profiles.
In our scheme, we provide the opportunity for advertising agencies to
mine over encrypted data (outsourced by the data owner to a cloud server)
and select target viewers for their advertisements without sending meta-data
to the IPTV and cloud server (i.e. advertisers mining techniques are not
manifested to the cloud server and possibly IPTV itself). In contrast to
previous works on similar schemes, our proposal relieve the data owner of the
cost associated with managing and processing of the data for advertisement
purposes.
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As mentioned in the Section 1, sensitive data has to be encrypted before
outsourcing it to protect data privacy. However, data encryption hinders
traditional data utilization techniques based on plaintext keyword search.
Considering the large number of users and documents in the cloud server, it
is crucial for the search service to facilitate multi-predicate queries. Many
searchable encryption schemes focus on a single keyword search. Wang et
al. [22] provide ranked keyword search over encrypted cloud data. In their
method the server knows the relevance order of documents containing specific
keyword; however, it is limited to single keyword search queries. In the
public key setting, Boneh et al. [9] present the first searchable encryption
construction using public key cryptosystem to perform search on encrypted
data. Several works on multi-keyword search were proposed [11, 10, 8, 20]
that enable conjunctive and disjunctive search options, but these schemes
incur large overhead in computation and/or communication costs.
An efficient scheme for conjunctive keyword-based search is proposed by
Wang et al. [23]. A searchable index is generated for each document which
contains all the keywords in the document. They use a cryptographic hash
function to map every keyword to a sequence of l bits, where l is the length of
hash digest and can be represented by r digit number in base 2d. However, if
the keyword set is small the solution is not secure. In the case of IPTV, the
number of keywords in subscribers data is small, so it is easy for the server
to guess the keywords in a query by a brute force attack.
In our solution, we adopt the scheme by Wang et al. [23] using keyed hash
function (HMAC) to map keywords to a sequence of l bits using a key known
only to the data owner. To search the encrypted data, advertisers must in
20
advance obtain so-called secure trapdoors from the data owner. Since those
trapdoors are generated using the data owner’s secret key, the server is not
able to learn any information about the search terms in the advertiser query
In our scenario, the cloud server is in charge of processing queries and
sending results back to the advertiser. The proposed solution is unique in
the sense that it protects the privacy of both subscribers and advertisers as
well as the IPTV business interests. In the following section we provide a
motivation for the chosen model.
3 Motivation and Contribution of the Thesis
This section provides information on why we select this subject for research
and our contributions.
3.1 Motivation
Collected information about subscribers such as demographic information,
watching history and preferences for IPTV contents is of particular interest
for the advertising business. On the one hand, the IPTV is in charge of pro-
tecting data from unauthorized access, but on the other hand he is willing to
sell subscriber profiles to third parties (e.g. advertising agencies) to generate
revenues. In this work we aim to propose an efficient targeted advertising
system, which does not require the involvement of IPTV in processing of
data for advertising purpose, while preserving the privacy of subscribers and
advertisers. We aim to place subscribers data on a cloud server and enable
advertisers to search over encrypted data. Since subscriber profiles are ac-
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cessed by the advertisers, we need to anonymize their demographic profiles
to prevent any privacy violation of subscribers by advertising agencies. In
addition, to enable IPTV to control who access data on the cloud, we need
to use a technique that allows only advertisers who purchase access to data
to query the database. One approach for anonymization would be to cluster
the subscribers having sufficiently similar demographics and watching traits.
Then cluster representatives would be placed in the cloud, whereby the ad-
vertisers utilize this summary data to match the relevant subscribers with
their advertisement portfolio. This technique is similar to the k-anonymity
algorithm, but is not the best in our setting due to the following reasons: i)
clustering may leak information about some subscribers, ii) the advertisers
have to use static clusters formed by the IPTV (loss of precision) and iii)
IPTV cannot control who access the data (loss of revenues). Since leaking
subscribers information is the most damaging problem from privacy perspec-
tive, we elaborate on how much information a malicious entity can gain.
We employ clustering technique on a dataset of 100 subscribers to find
whether subscribers data can be compromised or not. For the clustering,
we use k-medoids partitioning method [5], which groups n objects into k
clusters given a dataset of n objects. The k-medoids is a suitable alternative
for our dataset in which data objects have attributes of mixed type (e.g.
Binary: gender, Categorical: marital status, Ordinal: education and rate of
watching, etc.). Using this method, instead of publishing all subscribers to
the cloud server, only cluster representatives are presented.
In the following we show two strategies to gain private information (i.e. ex-
tract some features) from clustered data.
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• Fake users attack: Assume that the attacker knows some features
from the profile of a target subscriber existing in IPTV dataset. The
attacker can generate a couple of fake subscribers whose features are
very similar to the target subscriber and register them with the IPTV.
Since the IPTV uses k-medoids method, it is probable that the fake
subscribers along with the target subscriber are assigned to the same
cluster. Furthermore, the target subscriber may become the medoid of
the cluster if the features of the fake subscribers are suitably generated
by the attacker. If that scenario holds, the attack is successful since
the profile of one of the medoids published in the cloud server is the
same as the target subscriber. We performed an experiment to test
the scenario and the results are given in Table 1. We assumed that
the attacker knows all the features of the target subscriber profiles ex-
cept those listed in the Unknown features column in the Table. The
number of subscribers is 100, and we apply each attack on 30 different
target subscribers. The Success rate in the table shows the percent-
age of attacks that are successful. An attack is considered successful
when the target subscriber is assigned to the same cluster with the
fake subscribers and as a result the target user becomes the medoid of
that cluster. By being the medoid, the target profile is released on the
cloud server and the attacker is able to find the unknown features of
the target subscriber. For example, the first row in Table 1 refers to an
attacker who knows all the target features except the education level.
The attacker registers six fake subscribers whose features are exactly
the same as the target subscriber, but the education levels have differ-
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ent values. This attack is successful 96.66% of the time when applied
to 30 different targets.
dataset size # of attacks Avg # of
fake sub-
scribers
Unknown
features
Success rate
100 30 6 education 96.66
100 30 7 age 93.33
100 30 14 education,
age
90
100 30 12 education,
marital st
96.66
100 30 20 education,
marital st,
gender
86.66
100 30 118 education,
marital st,
gender, age
66.66
100 30 - education,
marital st,
gender,
age,
occupation
Not successful
100 30 10 education,
watching
habits
80
100 30 10 education,
marital st,
watching
habits
50
Table 1: Success rate of generating fake subscribers attacks
• The periodic updating of watching habits: Since clusters are gen-
erated based on the features of subscribers, updating their watching
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habits (as they change by time) can change the members of each clus-
ter causing alteration of clusters medoids. In our experiment on dataset
of 100 subscribers we choose k = 10 as number of clusters. We observe
that as the watching habits of the subscribers are updated a signifi-
cant number of cluster medoids changes. When we run the clustering
algorithm for initial dataset, the cluster medoids which are subscribers
with following IDs ( 1,26, 3, 16, 81, 10, 89, 28, 98, 43) are published
in the cloud server. By updating the watching habits of 30 subscribers
the medoid of the clusters are changed to subscribers with IDs (67, 26,
3, 28, 5, 95, 71, 28, 15, 18). In addition, taking the average of watching
habits in two consecutive weeks alter the medoids to subscribers (1, 26,
3, 16, 81, 95, 15, 28, 98, 41). Thus as time progresses, more information
about subscribers is available in the cloud.
These observations suggest the need for a more robust solutions. Instead
of clustering, privacy-preserving techniques in data publishing such as gen-
eralization, k-anonymity, and l-diversity are preferred to be used by IPTV
to anonymize demographic profile of subscribers. We propose a solution in
the remainder of this work to increase the privacy of subscribers and enable
IPTV to control access to data on the cloud server,
3.2 Contribution of the Thesis
In this thesis we focus on several issues involving privacy-preserving targeted
advertising scheme for IPTV. The first issue is to provide an efficient tech-
nique to encrypt the profile of IPTV subscribers and make it possible for
authorized advertising agencies to query over encrypted data. The second
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issue we deal with is to measure the efficiency of the provided method i.e.
how much the query results are related to the search terms and how long
does the server response take.
We provide a technique for ranked search, i.e. ranking the retrieved pro-
files in the order of their relevancies to corresponding query. By this method
the advertiser is able to learn more relevant profiles to its queries with the
additional benefit of decreasing the communication overhead. The advertis-
ers who are endorsed with trapdoors by the IPTV can query the cloud and
utilize the results; since these trapdoors are same for all advertisers, we also
design a protocol to prevent advertisers to sell their trapdoors to each other
and utilize unauthorized trapdoors.
4 Proposed Privacy-preserving Targeted Adver-
tising Scheme
This section provides detailed explanation for the proposed scheme. We begin
by describing the entities in our system and their goal and knowledge. Then
we will show the data model and general framework of the system. Finally,
we explain the methodology for proposed scheme.
4.1 Entities
There are three entities in our scheme.
• Data owner also called IPTV, is an entity that provides content to
viewers. It collects information about viewers demographics and weekly
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watching habits, which is stored in a database. Each individualized en-
try, called viewer profile, is considered private information. However,
statistical aggregation of viewer profiles can be released as long as in-
dividual entries cannot be recovered from the released information. To
increase profit the data owner is willing to sell any type of information
which does not violate the privacy of individual viewers. Furthermore,
the data owner aims to reduce management costs by outsourcing to
third parties database storage, backup and maintenance. Outsourc-
ing is considered information release and therefore should conform to
privacy restriction.
• Advertisers are entities that can generate targeted advertisements
based on viewer demographics and watching habits. Advertisements
are generated based on a secret advertiser strategy that requires as
input information about target viewers. Therefore the advertiser is
willing to purchase access to any database containing viewer profiles
such as a database generated by IPTV. However, since mining rules
can reveal information about advertiser strategy, the advertiser wants
to keep those rules secret.
• A server is a professional entity (e.g. cloud server, CS for short)
that offers computing and storage services to any party according to
specifications provided by said party. The CS does not deviate from
the provided specification but curious to infer any information from the
use of its services. We assume that it is against the business interest of
the CS to collude with any entity against other entities. As such the
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CS is what is known as “honest but curious" entity.
4.2 General framework
The general framework of the proposed system is illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: General framework of directed advertising service
IPTV provides personalized program contents to viewers and collects their
information. To reduce costs the IPTV is outsourcing its database manage-
ment to a cloud server. Since the cloud server is an entity external to IPTV,
the database can only be outsourced in a form which does not violate the
privacy of individual viewers, for example after encryption. Furthermore,
the cloud server should not be able to perform mining queries without IPTV
assistance and permission. Any prior IPTV assistance should be useful only
to the designated entities.
Advertiser purchases access to database stored on the cloud server. To
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perform mining the advertiser may require assistance from the IPTV. In our
solution the database is stored encrypted on the cloud server and therefore
the advertiser needs in advance certain trapdoor information generated by the
IPTV. It is also important that the trapdoor information is not transferable.
In addition, since the advertiser considers its mining rules trades secret, the
cloud server should not be able to infer any information about advertiser’s
queries.
The cloud server in advance obtains protocol specification from IPTV and
according to them services requests from authorized entities. Throughout
these interactions the CS does not collude with any entity to violate another
entity’s secret or private information. Furthermore, it does not deviate from
the provided specifications.
4.3 Data Model
We consider a scenario where the profile of each subscriber consists of seven
demographic features and eleven watching preferences. The demographic
features are age, gender, marital status, education, occupation, city, and
location; morning watching preferences are marriage, news, or health pro-
grams, afternoon – marriage, series, or sport programs, prime time – news,
competition, series, talk show, or sport program 2 which are called watching
habits. Our synthetic demographic profiles are assigned randomly within the
predefined categories (e.g. married, single, widow, or divorced for "marital
status") and watching habits are calculated according to these demographic
features. The value for a watched program is a number between zero and
2Afternoon sport and prime time sport programs are independent fields.
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one indicating the rate of time the subscriber spends on watching the pro-
gram during a week, the sum of these numbers for each week and for each
viewer must not exceed one. To provide ranked search to decide how much
the retrieved profiles are relevant to the query, we use the relation described
in Table 5. For example, the value 0.5 that appears in a viewer profile un-
der prime time news program implies that the viewer under consideration is
frequently watching such program.
We also speculate that watching habits of individuals are correlated to
their demographic features. Therefore, any synthetic data should take into
account such dependencies. We use our custom made data generator which
uses probabilistic selection process. The process conforms to some simple
expectations about the types of correlations that exist between demographic
features and watching preferences as illustrated in Table 2. In Table 2, the
rules used for each feature and preference are given. For instance, rnd stands
for uniformly random selection for all possible values of the corresponding
feature while 0.2-0.3 represents uniformly random selection in the interval
[0.2, 0.3]. These rules are not rigid and do not impose any restriction on
our proposed solution. Furthermore, the demographic features and watching
preferences can be modified and extended to real world scenarios. Demo-
graphic features and watching habits of one instance record (i.e. profile) of
the viewers database illustrated in Table 3 and 4 respectively.
30
Marriage Health News Competition Series
Talk
show
Sport
15-20 M rnd rnd rnd rnd 0.2-0.3 rnd 0.35-0.45
20-30,
30-40 M
illiterate
rnd rnd rnd rnd 0.2-0.3 0 0.2-0.3
20-30,
30-40 M
educated
0 rnd 0.2-0.3 rnd rnd 0.1-0.2 0.2-0.3
20-30,
30-40 M
illiterate
0.2-0.3 rnd rnd 0 rnd 0 0.15-0.25
20-30,
30-40 M
educated
rnd rnd 0.2-0.3 rnd rnd rnd 0.15-0.25
60+ M
illiterate
0.20-0.25 0.1-0.25 0.05-0.15 0 rnd 0 rnd
60+ M
educated
0-0.1 0.1-0.25 0.2-0.35 0 rnd 0 rnd
15-20 F rnd rnd rnd rnd 0.3-0.4 rnd 0.15-0.25
20-30,
30-40 F
illiterate
0.15-0.25 0.1-0.15 rnd rnd 0.2-0.3 rnd rnd
20-30,
30-40 F
educated
rnd rnd 0.15-0.25 rnd 0.2-0.3 rnd rnd
20-30,
30-40 F
illiterate
0.2-0.35
0.2-0.25
rnd rnd 0.3-0.4 0 rnd
20-30,
30-40 F
educated
rnd
0.2-0.25
0.2-0.3 rnd 0.3-0.4 rnd rnd
60+ F 0.2-0.35
0.1-0.25
rnd 0
0.2-0.35
0 rnd
Table 2: Rules for generating synthetic data and correlations of watching
preferences and demographics in synthetic database
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ID Age Gender Marital
Status
Education Occupation City Location
1 20-30 f married phd dentist Izmir high-income
Table 3: Demographic features
Program Rate of watch in a week
marriage(Ma) 0
marriage(Ab) 0
health(M) 0.15
news(M) 0.1
news(Pc) 0.35
competition(P) 0
series(A) 0
series(P) 0.2
talkshow(P) 0.05
sport(A) 0.05
sport(P) 0.1
aMorning
bAfternoon
cPrimeTime
Table 4: Watching habits
Rate of watch Rank Level
0 not watched 0
> 0 seldom 1
>= 0.15 average 2
>= 0.30 frequent 3
Table 5: Rate table
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4.4 Methodology
Our proposed approach is composed of three phases: Index generation, query
generation and oblivious search. In the following sections, we give detailed
information on how these phases are performed.
4.4.1 Index Generation
The actual solution is based on the construction proposed by Wang et al.
[23]. The main idea is to represent each database record as a binary string.
To accommodate n-ranked search each record is expended to n binary strings.
Without loss of generality following Table 5 there are three ranks “seldom”,
“average”, and “frequent” according to the rate given to each program per
week. Subsequently each database record is cloned three times, once for
each level. Each level clone contains the same demographic information but
includes a given program field only if the corresponding numerical value in
the original record is non zero and exceed the rate of watch lower bound as
in Table 5.
Table 6 is an example showing three rank levels for the sample viewer
profile in Tables 3, 4. All demographic features appear in three levels. Ac-
cording to Table 5 the level one clone also contains programs having rate
greater than 0. Consequently the level two clone contains all the programs
having rate equal or greater than 0.15. Finally the third level contains pro-
grams with rate equal or greater that 0.3 which in this case is only news(P )
program.
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Level rank keywords
1 seldom 20-30, f, married, phd, dentist, Izmir, high-income, health(M),
health, news(M), news(P), series(P), talkshow(P), sport(A),
sport(P)
2 average 20-30, f, married, phd, dentist, Izmir, high-income, health(M),
news(P), series(P)
3 frequently 20-30, f, married, phd, dentist, Izmir, high-income, news(P)
Table 6: Rank Levels for a sample profile
We will describe how to generate the binary string records corresponding
to rank one, other ranks are generated in an analogous way. Firstly, the IPTV
selects a HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code) key. This key is
updated for each novel data sent to the cloud server. With m we bound the
maximum number of fields in each profile; from now on we call these fields
keywords and each database record a profile. A profile may have less that m
keywords.
Suppose a given profile at a given rank contains keywords {w1, . . . , wm}. To
generate the corresponding rank binary string (index) IPTV computes the
l-bit HMAC hi of each keyword wi (HMAC: {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l). Let
hi = h
r−1
i , . . . , h
1
i , h
0
i (4.1)
be the base 2d representation of hi. From hi for each keyword wi the IPTV
computes a binary string (keyword trapdoor) Ii
Ii = (I
r−1
i , . . . , I
j
i , . . . , I
1
i , I
0
i ), (4.2)
where
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Iji =
 0 if h
j
i = 0
1 otherwise
(4.3)
The index for the given profile at the given rank is computed as
I = mi=1Ii. (4.4)
where  denotes bitwise production.
The IPTV sends to the cloud server records which have the form
(pid, I
seldom, Iaverage, Ifrequent),
where Irank is the index of the viewer profile at rank rank and pid is an
anonymized pseudonym for a viewer.
As an example, if the l-bit output of HMAC hi is 101100001101001101110000;
it can be represented by 6-digit number in base 24 that is hi=11,0,13,3,7,0.
According to (4.3), hi is reduced to 6-bit binary string where each bit is
assigned zero if hji = 0 and one otherwise. The binary string of the given
HMAC output will be 101110.
4.4.2 Query Generation and Oblivious Search on the Database
Data mining can be performed on the information available on the cloud
server if an entity knows keyword trapdoors. Only the IPTV can compute
those trapdoors as that computation is equivalent to producing HMAC whose
key is available only to the IPTV. An advertiser can purchase from the IPTV
any subset of keywords associated with database entries. A conjunctive query
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of keywords (i.e. w1, . . . , wn) is the bitwise product of the corresponding
trapdoors
Iq = ni=1Ii = qr−1 . . . q0.
A conjunctive query from the advertiser to the cloud server is such r-bit
binary sequence (no matter how many search terms exist in the query) and
search is done only by r-bit comparisons. The index of the query is compared
with the first level index of each profile. The indices of two other levels only
be compared if the query matches with the first level index. The server
response is a list of pid such that each pid’s index, Ipid , matches the query Iq.
We say that Ipid = jr−1 . . . j0 matches Iq = qr−1 . . . q0 if
∀i ∈ [0, . . . , r − 1], qi = 0⇒ ji = 0. (4.5)
Responses are returned rank wise for the records, that is for seldom,
average, and frequent ranks the cloud server returns separate anonymized id
list.
Our proposed method supports conjunctive search formulas meaning that
all the predicates in the query (predicate1 AND predicate2 AND ....) must
exist in the profile to become an answer to that query. However, the ad-
vertiser is able to perform disjunctive queries by merging the responses of
several conjunctive or single-word queries.
4.4.3 False Accept Rate
The indexing method that we employ covers all the information on keywords
in a single r-bit index file. Independent from the hash function, after reduc-
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tion and bitwise product operation there is a possibility that index of a query
may wrongly match with an irrelevant profile which is called False Accept
Rate (FAR for short). The system is free from false rejects, meaning if a
profile contains all of the predicates in the query, that profile will definitely
be a match to the query. The FAR is calculated as:
number of incorrect matches
number of all matches
We illustrate FAR with an example. Suppose that the zero bits in the
index of the query Q1, correspond to zero bits in the index of Q2.
Q1(30-40, F, Istanbul, News-primetime)
Q2(50-60, M, Istanbul, Talkshow-primetime, Competition-primetime).
Therefore subscribers who are in the category of the Q2 are wrongly included
in the response of the Q1. Those wrongly included subscribers are incorrect
matches.
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Figure 3: False Accept Rate(d = 5, index = 480 bits)
Figure 3 compares false accept rate of queries containing two, three, four,
and five predicates between the profiles containing 0, . . . , 48 keywords where
index size (r) is 480 bits and d=5. The FAR results shown in the figures
are computed by taking average of 100 random queries. The false accept
rate increases rapidly after 38 keywords per profile due to the increase in the
number of zeros in the index file. In our experiments the maximum number
of keywords per profile is 18. To get a better intuition we extended our
experiment to test the relationship between the parameters. If more keywords
are required per profile, false accept rates can be reduced by increasing the
index size (i.e. choosing a longer HMAC function) and choosing larger base
2d. The false accept rates given in Figure 4 and 5 are calculated for 784-bit
and 1040-bit index and d=6. We observe that the false accept rates decrease
significantly in comparison to the rates in Figure 3. Having 1040-bit index
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and d=6 leads to the lowest false accept rate as illustrated in Figure 5.
0 18 28 38 48
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
# of keywords per profile
FA
R
 (%
)
FAR (d=6, index=784)
 
 
1 keyword in query
2 keywords in query
3 keywords in query
4 keywords in query
5 keywords in query
Figure 4: False Accept Rate(d = 6, index = 784 bits)
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The more keywords in a profile the more zeros in the index of the profile,
therefore a higher chance of matching these profiles incorrectly. However, for
the number of keywords in a query no conclusive results are obtained about
the relationship between the number of keywords in the query and the false
accept rate.
For example, if Q1 ⊂ Q2, then
result(Q2) ⊂ result(Q1)⇒ FA(Q2) ⊂ result(Q1)
the falsely accepted (FA) profiles for Q2 are the subset of Q1 results. The
FA profiles of Q1 and Q2 are not necessarily identical. There may be several
profiles which are matched incorrectly with Q1 index, while the zero bits in
the indexes of these profiles do not match with the zero bits of Q2 index.
In addition, the FA profiles for Q2 may be in the list of correct matches
for Q1. For example, suppose Q2=(m, 20-30, married) and Q1=(m, 20-30).
Among the FA profiles for the Q2 can be a profile with (m, 20-30, widow,
Istanbul, sport-afternoon), which is a correct match for the Q1. On the other
hand, increasing the keywords in a query is likely to decrease the number of
matches returned as query results. Consequently, having fewer number of
incorrect matches may create greater FAR. In our system the possibility of
false accept rate or false reject rate is zero due to relatively fewer number of
keywords per profile.
Increasing the index size, which is useful to decreases the false accept rate,
increase the computation cost and storage requirements. Table 11 in Section
6.3 shows the times it takes to generate indexes of the profiles for different
values for r and d. There is a trade-off between computation cost and false
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accept rate. Optimized value for index size should be chosen considering the
requirements of the applications where the proposed method is used.
4.4.4 Trapdoor Non-transferability Protocol
The trapdoors which are legally purchased by the advertisers are called au-
thorized trapdoors. Since the trapdoors for the same purchased keywords
are the same, it is possible for advertising agencies to sell their authorized
trapdoors to each others and utilize unauthorized trapdoors in their queries.
In this section we provide a protocol to prevent advertising agencies from
utilizing unauthorized trapdoors in their queries.
Public keys of the participants: Assume that PUX and PRX are pub-
lic key and the private key of the party X, respectively. Further assume
that an advertiser (ADV) purchases the following trapdoors (I1, I2, . . . , In)
corresponding to the keywords (w1, w2, . . . , wn). The IPTV performs the
following steps:
1. Computes I = ni=1Ii.
2. Generates the signature for the trapdoors sold to ADV
S = SIGNPRIPTV (I, PUADV ).
3. Sends (S, I) to ADV.
The advertiser validates the signature S. For a query that involves the key-
words {w1, w2, . . . , wt}, the advertiser and the cloud server execute the fol-
lowing protocol steps:
1. ADV computes Iq = ti=1Ii.
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2. ADV sends (I, S), Iq to CS.
3. CS continues if the signature is verified, otherwise it aborts the protocol.
4. For I = jr−1 . . . j0 and Iq = qr−1 . . . q0 CS checks
∀i ∈ [0, . . . , r − 1], qi = 0⇒ ji = 0
if Iq matches with I, meaning that ADV is authorized to ask such
query, and CS continues, otherwise it aborts the protocol.
5. CS performs the query and generates the response R, which includes
the list of ids matching the predicate in the query.
6. CS selects a symmetric key k and performs the following encryptions
ENCPUADV (k) and ENCk(R). Next he sends the resulting ciphertexts
to ADV.
7. ADV decrypts ENCPUADV (k) with his private key and obtains k. Know-
ing the symmetric key, the advertiser can obtain the response.
5 Privacy Arguments
In this section we show how the proposed scheme addresses the privacy re-
quirements in our setting. We assume that the database schema (i.e. key-
words and their values) is known information and that the adversary does
not have statistical information about the database and does not know the
mapping between the keywords and trapdoors.
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5.1 Data and Query Privacy
We argue that the encrypted index does not leak useful information about
subscribers profile. Our scheme substitute the hash function of Wang et al.
[23] with a keyed HMAC function. Following [23, Theorem 1] a polynomially
bounded adversary can only learn trivial information about the data entries
from the index published on the cloud server.
The underlying HMAC function protects the users’ profiles against unau-
thorized access. To recover the complete information given only an index
value a polynomial time adversary A needs to perform an exhaustive search
on all possible HMAC keys. This is true both for database and query in-
dices. With the current technology for 128-bit random key no adversary can
reconstruct the user profile.
5.2 Unlinkability
We argue that an advertiser has hardly any reason to send the same query
twice to the same database. Given HMAC tags for two different messages
(keywords) are not related an adversary can only learn that a set of keywords
in a given query are the subset of the keywords in another query by comparing
the position of zeros similar to Equation 4.5.
Updating the HMAC key for each novel data sent to the CS causes trap-
doors and all the records in the cloud to be changed. Unless there is a
weakness in HMAC key whereby, given two HMAC tags for the same mes-
sages under different keys are related, queries to different databases cannot
be linked. Similarly the values contains in different databases cannot be
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associated with each others.
5.3 Privacy of the Non-transferability Protocol
The protocol in Section 4.4.4 prevents advertisers from utilizing unautho-
rized trapdoors in their queries. The index in IPTV signature allows the CS
to identify if the keywords in a given query were indeed purchased by the
advertiser. This prevents an advertiser from querying the database with the
keyword the advertiser did not purchase. Furthermore the advertiser id un-
der the IPTV signature allows the CS to identify which advertiser purchased
the access to the database. The encryption CS uses prevents an advertiser
A from selling keywords to advertiser B. Indeed if advertiser B purchases
keywords from advertiser A rather than IPTV then either advertiser B has
to reveal its query to advertiser A or advertiser A has to give its private key
to advertiser B. In either case one of the advertisers may be leaking some
non-trivial information about their advertising strategies via their queries to
a competitor. Thus advertisers have no incentives to collude against IPTV.
Since the CS response is encrypted using the advertiser public key only
the designated advertiser learns the information transferred. Therefore the
strategies used by various advertisers are hidden from each other.
6 Performance Evaluation
In the following sections, we present complexity of the system, system con-
figuration and discuss the timing results.
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6.1 Complexity
In this section, we evaluate the complexity of the proposed technique. The
communication and computational costs are analyzed separately. We used
the following notation:
N - number of profiles.
m - the number of keywords in each profile for the given rank.
t - number of purchased keywords by an advertiser
k - number of keywords to search
β - number of profiles matched with the query
α - number of nominated ids for targeted advertisement
r - size of index
h - hash digest size
η - number of rank levels
6.1.1 Communication overhead
Data owner-Server communication: Data owner sends profile indices
to server weekly, which is Nr bits or Nrη bits in case η ranking is used.
Data owner-Advertiser communication:
• Stage one: Data owner sends the trapdoors for the purchased keywords
to an advertiser. This communication is performed again if the adver-
tiser purchases a new keyword or if the secret key of the data owner is
changed.
• Stage two: Advertiser sends nominated ids and advertisement to the
data owner. Therefore advertiser sends 32α bits to the data owner
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assuming each id is a 32-bit integer, plus the content of the advertise-
ment.
Advertiser-Server communication: Advertiser sends a single r-bit query
index to the server if the query is conjunctive. The server sends only anonymized
ids, therefore transmitting 32β bits to the advertiser.
The communication costs are summarized in Table 7.
Communication cost (bit)
Data owner-Server Nr
Nrη if ranking is used
Data owner-Advertiser tr
Advertiser-Data owner 32α+ advertisement
Advertiser-Server r
Server-Advertiser 32β
Table 7: Communication cost in the proposed system
When the trapdoor non-transferability protocol in Section 4.4.4 is used, the
communication cost incurred by each party is explained below and illustrated
in Table 8, the RSA modulus n is 1024 bits.
Data owner-Server communication. This part of the communication is not
affected by the non-transferability protocol.
Data owner-Advertiser communication.
• Stage one: Data owner sends trapdoors of t purchased keywords (i.e.
tr bits), an r-bit index computed by bitwise product oft trapdoors, and
a 1024-bit signature.
• Stage two: Advertiser sends nominated ids and advertisement to the
data owner. Therefore advertiser sends 32α bits to the data owner
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assuming each id is a 32-bit integer, plus the content of the advertise-
ment.
Advertiser-Server communication. The advertiser sends the signature, r-bit
trapdoor (computed by bitwise production of t trapdoors), and r-bit query index
if the query is conjunctive. The server sends an RSA encryption of the symmetric
key and symmetric encryption of the query’s response to the advertiser.
Communication cost (bit)
Data owner-Server Nr
Nrη if ranking is used
Data owner-Advertiser tr + 1024 + r
Advertiser-Data owner 32α+ advertisement
Advertiser-Server 1024 + 2r
Server-Advertiser 1024 + response
Table 8: Communication costs in the proposed system using non-
trasferability protocol
6.1.2 Computational Overhead
The following is the computational cost for each party in the system.
Data owner. Creates weekly profile indices.
Advertiser. Only prepare an index for a query which involves bitwise products
of binary strings.
Server. The server performs search operation, which is basically r-bit binary
comparisons with the database entries. If ranking is used, the server performs
at most η − 1 additional binary comparison for each matching profile.
The computational costs are summarized in Table 9.
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Computational cost (bit)
Data owner
∑j=N
j=1
∑i=η
i=1(m× h-bit hash +m bitwise product of r-bit binary string)
Advertiser bitwise products of k indices (k × r)
(Without ranking)
Server N × r binary comparison
(With ranking)
N × r + (η − 1)× β × r binary comparisons
Table 9: Computational costs in the proposed system
For the case where the non-trasferability protocol is used, the computational
cost is summarized in Table 10.
Data owner creates profile indices periodically (e.g. weekly). For each advertiser,
the data owner computes r-bit trapdoors for the t purchased keywords and bitwise
product of t trapdoors to obtain an r-bit index I. Data owner signs I and the public
key of the advertiser together and sends the resulting signature to the advertiser.
Advertiser. Verifies the signature. To perform a conjunctive query of k keywords,
the advertiser calculates bitwise product of k trapdoors. To get the response, the
advertiser performs an RSA decryption to obtain a symmetric key followed by a
symmetric decryption.
Server. The server verifies the signature and checks if the advertiser is autho-
rized to ask the query by comparing the index of the query and I. To generate
the response, CS performs r-bit binary comparisons with the database en-
tries. If ranking is used, the server performs at most η− 1 additional binary
comparisons for each matching profile. Finally CS selects a symmetric key
which is encrypted with the public key of the advertiser and encrypts the
response with the symmetric key.
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Computational cost (bit)∑j=N
j=1
∑i=η
i=1(m× h-bit hash +m bitwise product of r-bit binary string)
Data owner t× h-bit hashes +t bitwise products of r-bit trapdoors
1024-bit RSA signature
1024-bit RSA signature verification.
Advertiser (k × r) bitwise products of k trapdoors
To get response:
RSA decryption of the symmetric key and symmetric decryption of the response
1024-bit RSA signature verification.
r-bit binary comparisons
(Without ranking)
Server N × r binary comparisons
(With ranking)
N × r + (η − 1)× β × r binary comparisons
RSA encryption of the symmetric key and symmetric encryption of the response
Table 10: Computational costs in the proposed system using non-
trasferability protocol
6.2 System configuration
The proposed framework is developed in C++. The whole system is tested
on a workstation with the following configuration:
• Widows 7 Professional (64-bit)
• Intel Xeon Core 6 Processor at 3.20 GHz
• 8 GB RAM.
Database specifications:
• custom made synthetic database
• 7 demographic features
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• 11 watching habits
• number of profiles varies from 5,000 to 80,000.
• Index size is 480 bits.
Used algorithm specifications:
• HMAC using SHA-2 hash function. The output size of the hash func-
tion can be 224, 256, 384, or 512 bits. The block size for 224 and 256 bits
output size is 64 bytes and 128 bytes for the others. The size of secret
key is 128 bits. (for HMAC the codes in http://code.google.com/p/rainmeter
are used)
• RSA based public key encryption and digital signature with 1024 bits
modulus. (Miracl library is used for RSA operations)
6.3 Timing Results
In our first experiment the HMAC function produces 300 bytes output, which
is generated by concatenating outputs of SHA2-based HMAC functions of
different lengths. We choose d = 5, thus after reduction the index size (r) is
60 bytes (480 bits). In our experiments, the datasets have different number
of subscribers varying from 5,000 to 80,000 with each profile having at most
18 keywords. Data owner timing results for index generation are presented in
Figure 6. Since these operations are performed periodically (e.g. weekly) and
index calculation can be parallelized, the presented technique is practical and
efficient from data owner’s perspective. Timing results for index calculation
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with parallelization are illustrated in 7, which are approximately five times
less than the original case.
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Figure 6: Timing for index generation (d=5, index=480 bits)
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Figure 7: Timing for index generation with parallelization
51
Timings for search with and without ranking is relatively low as shown
in Figure 8. Therefore, the scheme is efficient from cloud server’s perspective
as well The time to construct a single query by the advertiser is negligible
and therefore the overall system is efficient.
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Figure 8: Timing for query search
When the non-transferability protocol presented in Section 4.4.4 is used
the response time at cloud server side will increase due to signature verifica-
tion and RSA encryption as illustrated in Figure 9.
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Figure 9: Timing for query search using the non-transferability protocol
Table 11 shows the effect of various d and r (index size) values on index
calculation time at data owner side and storage requirement on the cloud
server.
# of profiles Index Generation Time
(ms) without rank
storage (bit)
d=4, index=344 5000 2225 5000× 344
d=5, index=480 5000 3613 5000× 480
d=6, index=656 5000 6050 5000× 656
d=6, index=784 5000 7122 5000× 784
d=6, index=1040 5000 10468 5000× 1040
Table 11: Index generation time and storage requirement for various r and d
values
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7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis, we propose a practical scheme for privacy-preserving targeted
advertising service using cloud computing. Since the IPTV is not willing
to deal with management and processing of subscribers data for advertising
purposes, it prefers to outsource data into the cloud. IPTV uses an indexing
method to encrypt subscriber profiles and provide trapdoors to advertising
agencies to enable them sending queries to the cloud. Our experiments show
that the proposed system is efficient from the perspective of each party.
Construction of a single query by the advertiser takes negligible amount of
time while a query search by the cloud server takes relatively low amount
of time, which can be performed even by regular desktop computers. The
index generation operations need to be performed periodically that can be
parallelized so the technique is practical from data owner’s perspective. The
false accept rates are quite low showing that a very high percentage of the
advertisements will reach to the right subscribers.
The system gives high amount of flexibility to advertisers to perform
different queries on the database and use the results in their data mining
algorithms to determine a set of subscribers that would be interested in their
advertisements. There is no need for the IPTV to design any algorithm
or develop software to send advertisements to related subscribers; thus it
is relieved partially from management cost and processing of data. Data
mining jobs are done by the advertisers who are professional in this subject
and the cloud server is responsible to search the database and find the related
subscribers. IPTV generates only indices of the profiles, which is performed
weekly and sends the targeted advertisements to nominated subscribers.
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Following the current research, we propose possible directions for future
work. We plan to develop a system that allows to send complex queries. Our
proposed method only supports conjunctive (AND) queries as explained in
Section 4.4.2. We aim to support queries such as (predicate1 AND predicate2,
NOT predicate3).
As a future work, we will enable IPTV to estimate the number of house-
hold in a house and their other characteristics such as age range by examining
the watching habits during a week or consecutive weeks; this information is
beneficial to find the best targets for an advertisement since one house is
usually inhabited by several people with different watching habits.
We will test our proposed system on real data to examine its accuracy
and efficiency. The privacy arguments will be studied in more details and
proofs will be provided.
Also as future work, we will provide a technique to enable advertiser
agencies to make sure that their advertisements are delivered to the right
subscribers since they pay for this service.
Finally, the technique that encrypts the advertisement content, whereby
only the targeted subscribers can see the content, will increase the privacy
of both advertisers and subscribers.
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APPENDIX - Notation
• P - collection of subscribers profiles, denoted as a set of n profiles
P = {P1, P2, ..., Pn}
• Q- represents a query.
• Iq - the index of the query Q.
• R - the response of the query Q.
• hi - the HMAC output for the keyword wi.
• l - the output size of HMAC, represented by r digit in base 2d. (l = rd)
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